Aziz Fall

Doug Miller 00:00

We’re in progress. I turned off the AI thing because this is just an interview, not with not a meeting as such. So I’m Doug Miller here in Montreal. This is November 5, 2025 I’m with Aziz Fall, our guest interview today, and with Gwen Schulman, all of us, I believe, are in Montreal, looks like a Montreal scene for Aziz today, and we’re very happy to have Aziz present so as he’s the standard opening goals that you’ve received the consent form, you’ve already sent it back completed, but I ask you to verbally acknowledge and assent to the conditions and whatever is written in that consent form.

Aziz Fall 00:53

Acknowledged seeing and signing the consent form. Indeed, I’m really happy to be part of this endeavour.

Doug Miller 01:00

Good. Thank you so much. Sorry for the formalities, but let me start by Aziz, I’ve heard your story bits and pieces over time, in scattered form a way, but would you just bring myself and others into your own personal background? How, just in brief, tell us where you’re from, what kind of experience you had as a youth, and at what point did you become exposed to apartheid and how?

Aziz Fall 01:31

Yeah, in my case, I mean, I have no merit as I grew up in a very dedicated family. My father and mother were pan-Africanist. You know, my father seek asylum in the Congo, was appointed as ambassador in in Egypt, where he met my mother. So we grew up in, I would say, an internationalist environment, even though my father had mixed feelings about communism. You know, I think he was kind of a socialist, but moderate socialist, but he was an aristocrat, as we belong to the Cayor and Baol, we used to be, you know, small kingdoms in Senegal. So we were raised with those values, and I was one of the rogue rebel kids in the house contesting some of it, because first I was playing music, and we were not allowed to play music.

But I was exposed very early to this issue with two events. One was the killing of Blondin Diop, who was actually one of our young activist, political activist, Marxist who was killed, and he was the son of my daughter. And the second event happening the same year was the Soweto event.

So that period of my life was already a period where I have started to be acquainted with underground movements in Senegal. It used to be, you know, uni-party system. So political party were not allowed, and I start frequenting movements who were contesting the killing of Blondin but also the Soweto uprising and the killings. So very early I would, in a way, exposed to this reality, which already also we have in Senegal. At that time, we didn’t have the segregation as South Africa, but it was clear, divide, class, divide based on race, white, mainly European and Lebanese. You know, living in the wealthy part of the town, and people around the government and the other wealthy foreigners living in those neighbourhoods. So I was living in a neighbourhood which was halfway. We had slums in one corner and fancy villas on the other so I was exposed to that kind of environment.

And soon I started to be more and more active in this activism. And one day I stole my father’s car and I had an accident. I was really fortunate that I escaped, but from that day, they realized the country was dangerous, and I choose, once I got my bachelor to leave, and instead of going to France, I was intrigued about this space. It was a cartoon that we were reading, and was Les aventures de Black le Roc and this happened to be Lower Canada patriots, and it was actually Parti communiste français who used to publish that cartoon. We didn’t know the whole story, but that was the place I choose to go and end up in Moncton, New Brunswick, and the funny thing is, no one actually knew about Black Law Hawk in New Brunswick because of the English censorship. But soon I found out, you know that you know on the plane on upon arriving, as I cross through New York, I had to fill this form. And the form was asking whether or not you were in contact with communist parties, or if you are yourself a communist. And you have really to know that.

Gwen Schulman 05:52

And what year would this be approximately? Do you remember this?

Aziz Fall

This is 1981

Gwen Schulman

Okay.

Aziz Fall 05:59

And so when you cross through New York, you, you know, before landing, you had to fill that thing. And it was very explicit whether you had contact with a communist organization or whether you were a communist. So the Moncton endeavour, in my case, was quite short. I just spent a whole year there. Was exposed to, you know, very, very different society indeed, learned a great deal about the condition of native the divide on language. And you know that university just happened to had a big strike the year before, so it was still boiling. So I had, you know, the chance of just being in the right environment, except that it was little expensive. So I left and I came –

Gwen Schulman 06:53

Before you move on. Was there any anti-apartheid activity at the university?

Aziz Fall 06:57

Not at all, not at all on the campus. There were none it. I was exposed to that when I arrived in Montreal. We have to say that at the time, as we were all supportive of ANC and all of those things, but it was theoretical. You know, we learn and deeply learn from facts that this system was created from Canada and implemented in South Africa.

So already, we had mixed feelings on the way we were treated. We were students. We were not allowed to earn an income. You know, it was not like today. You’re not allowed to work. You are devoted to your study. And here, the ANC was considered as a terrorist organization. So easily as I was already in the field. I was studying political science, we noticed two or three things. One, the way the African groups or the groups that were working on immigration issues were either apolitical or didn’t want to touch this topic. Those who were in link with TransAfrica, which was like an US advocate for black American interests abroad, but very interested in in the anti-apartheid movement. It was mainly some Anglophones who were really in contact with local folks from South Africa or other Southern African countries. You had clearly a divide between the two communities of African, English speaking and the French speaking.

And here in Canada, at the time, it was mainly either people who were linked with the trade union movement, some NGOs, who are in charge of this issue. So when, in my case, all, all this happened in once, like the turning point was 1984 where, with a couple of friends, we were already trying to organize things, we launched GRILA. But GRILA was an organization that even the, and some of you probably didn’t notice, but the acronym of GRILA was guerrilla, in fact, and it was built with an underground organization underneath, like the missing letters of GRILA was like a nucleus group which never really happened to exist a few months later. But our idea was we had to, to organize. So we asked a permission to register the organization. It was dismissed. So GRILA functioned until very, very late as an informal organization. And I think it was in the late 90s that we formally registered in Canada, which never –

Doug Miller 10:18

Can you just give us the meaning of the acronym, please?

Aziz Fall 10:22

So the meaning is Group for Research and Initiative for the Liberation of Africa. The group the research initiative for liberation the Africa. And that year was the year where the Free South Africa Movement is launched in the neighbouring states, United States, and where you have, you know, protest and pressure against the South African government. It was also the year where most of the structural adjustment policies are spreading in in the continent, to the exception of Burkina Faso, who you know, had this insurrection and this coup d’état, and where it was Upper Volta at the time, and where Thomas Sankara took power.

So we were like in a very, very sensitive period, where, indeed, Canada was an ally of the South African government, the companies, the investment, most of the establishment was, you know, having very good relation with the Canadian authorities, just for the sake of history, you know, The Commonwealth story, the way those dominions were built link that were very solid with most of NATO countries and the West and the same time. I can’t recall whether it were the same time or a few months later, finally, United States and the United Kingdom start to do this selective economic sanction against South Africa, but it was mild.

And anyway, we started to work on this issue, among other things, like we didn’t focus just on South Africa. We were interested on the situation of Ethiopia at the time, also where we had hunger, but also civil war and strife. The structural adjustment policies were really worrisome for most of us. So we were kind of doing many, many things, quite frantically, but with a focus, with this story of the South African and southern frontline countries.

I was also very fortunate to be to go back to my period where I started to Be involved in those activist work when I was teenage. It was that same period where Amilcar Cabral in the PAIGC was working. So those link really helped us also have contact with Angolans, Mozambique and very few in the country at the time, but we have started establishing link with friends in Europe, African American, African who seek asylum here on the state or in Europe so slowly, having a web of relation with all these comrades.

At the time we had a crisis here in the NGO community, SUCO was dismantled, and SUCO was one of the rare French NGO who was quite outspoken, because you had CUSO and SUCO, but CUSO was already involved in that struggle. As I said, NGOs and trade unions were the one and in a certain way, also, I think the churches, United Church and some Jesuits, so that was kind of the landscape at the time. It was quite a religious country. People were not necessarily open-minded on the story of what is happening in South Africa.

The issue of apartheid was, at the time, not very popular, and as I said, they were still considering the radical activists are potential terrorists. So, you know, you had religious and community group, you know, I think, who are very demonstrative. And, you know, the core was basically Toronto, but all of those groups, mainly those who were funded by CIDA at the time, had to sign that they were apolitical, so, whether it’s TCLSAC or what is going to be later, CIDA, because when SUCO imposed in Sedal, Sayad and so on, all those group who were working with government subsidies were not supposed to have political stance, and that was probably part of the conditionalities that they were, you know, obliged to follow, I trust at the time.

So it was in a very interesting period, and things start accelerating within, I would say, for my recollection, four years. Within four years to five years, we had an amazing speed and mushrooming of the movement, due to the anti-apartheid movement, but due also to the constructive engagement policy in South Africa, mainly the consequence of the independence of Zimbabwe, the frontline state resisting and the sabotage undergone in Mozambique and Angola.

So, you know, they were like a conjunction of, I would say, not a movement, but a set of unions, religious group, NGOs, slowly gathering and opposing South Africa’s apartheid regime. And that would take any kind of things, you know, either protest letters, boycott and advocacy work, etc. At GRILA, we didn’t have the means to have such power. We didn’t have money. It was mainly a student group, but we had something that most group didn’t have, which was our relation with the ANC, starting with Yusuf Saloojee at the time. And you know, we were very fortunate that the tourist people trusted us here and slowly building, you know, underground, strong relations with them.

But at the time, our own group was also divided on, you know, the ideological gap between the PAC and the ANC, and as we were an internationalist and were against those in our group who wanted to be a Black African group, so most of those comrades finally left. But there were a tendency at the time in the inception where we were, you know, navigating between the two. Biko was, I mean, an icon, and, you know, we were using it with no mixed feelings. The idea of Malcolm X, “by any means necessary”. We were quite radical, but in the same token, we had chosen that this is an internationalist battle, and among our rank, we have to accept anyone who is internationalist and pan-Africanist. And those are the two only criteria that we should have and that allow us to get rid of those who either were too radical or, in fact, racist in in a certain way, because they would not accept even what they were calling coloured people or Asian and so on.

So because of that very peculiar, I guess, characteristic of our group, we started to be more and more active in the academic milieu, in the activist milieu and because the fact that NGOs were playing on both ground also in the NGO media. So when the crisis was finally resolved, CIDMAA –

Gwen Schulman 19:39

Which crisis?

Aziz Fall 19:43

The crisis of SUCO, crisis of SUCO, allows CIDMAA to specialize on South Africa. So they were almost the one having the monopoly on what is said on relation with the trade unions, with the other similar organizations in the west and in Toronto, with the academic milieu and very few, how you say outreach with the African community as such. So we were, in the beginning as objective ally of CIDMAA.

So I ended up being on the board of CIDMAA with another comrade from the ANC who just seek asylum at the time, Dan O’Meara. And CIDMAA, at the time, was doing an immense contribution. We had people of our generation, like Marie-Hélène Bonin, or younger, like Stéphan Corriveau, but the core animator of the group was Pierre Beaudet, who happened to be a Marxist and a radical Québécois who had immense capacity of organization. Unfortunately, he passed away. But most of those organization, as I’ve said, was receiving subsidies from the state. So they had just, you know –

Doug Miller 21:14

Just one more thing, the acronym, CIDMAA.

Aziz Fall 21:18

Centre d’information et de documentation sur le Mozambique et l’Afrique australe. Okay, it was the main organization here doing the anti-apartheid work. The rest was NGOs, who were actually having either a section working on it, or churches or some trade unions who would have, you know, the chance of, you know, getting along with other trade unions in the West. And you know, would benefit for tours when South African would come in the country. As I said, recollection period and as we are ageing, but those period of my life were very special because we were, we were doing outreach with any other group. Were doing the same things.

And the idea for us was, we have to unite, you know, with any means necessary, we need to unite against the Canadian government, against the RCMP, against any interest in the investment milieu, in the academic milieu that would help the system. So we started to be effective, quite effective in a way, you know, beginning was basically letters and having MPs on our side, you know, but did –

Gwen Schulman 22:54

What was the strategy to get MPs on board?

Aziz Fall 23:08

The MPs came later, I think around 80, I think 80s were the period where, but you already had the shift. But I think for our group, the first thing that really was instrumental was the killing of Dulcie September. But at the time we had already had good relation with CIDMAA, we were preparing, you know, a whole strategy towards the government, toward trade unions, toward the church, toward the youth with an envelope of many as the government even was not no longer reluctant to pay, you know, for South Africans to come.

And I think one of, I can’t remember exactly the timing, but one of the turning point where they shift from the Jesuit and the churches when Desmond Tutu came, you know, we were not religious at all, and you know, that was not my cup of tea, but it actually generated an immense effect in our ranks. And all of a sudden we had other people that were not, you know, the usual people joining because of that very input coming from, from the church.

Anyway, I think at the time, it was no longer support, possible to endorse or support the apartheid system, but it was so implicated, so spread in the financial and investment system of this country, that the idea of having the sanctions and the boycott started. That to be accepted. And we start, you know, doing our homework, tracking any company, any product, and, you know, starting to establish list in groceries, in, you know, factories, anything. It was an immense task, and based on almost denunciation, you know, like this guy is frequenting on this product is coming from. So we start establishing lists and assembling this work of on that we have used the anti-apartheid international movement a great deal because many of those products in Britain and in United States were known. So we had the opportunity of using that material and fitting, whether they match with what is happening in Canada. But as I said, the killing of Dulcie September –

Gwen Schulman 25:57

Can you please? A lot of people will not recognize that name? Can you just –

Aziz Fall 26:01

Yeah, so Dulcie September. She was one of the rare female ANC member who was appointed as chief representative of ANC in France. You know, so in France, you had group like SOS Racisme, like RMDC, etc. Those people we were already in contact with, so we received a letter from her, and we start establishing link. And this poor lady was followed and killed as she was monitoring and mapping the trade, the trade arm, the trade arms that existed within NATO countries, Israel, Canada, France, United States, etc. She was an non-violent person, you know, against even the, you know, the armed liberation struggle in South Africa. So those were the moderate people you know, speak French, various languages, and she, she, she was killed by several bullets. It was really something horrible.

Gwen Schulman 27:11

In Paris.

Aziz Fall

Sorry.

Gwen Schulman

In Paris.

Aziz Fall 27:15

In Paris, like she was opening her, you know, her office. They killed her in the back, tiny, little lady, you know, I mean, just something outrageous, and that actually just radicalized the movement. From our side was like, these people have no mercy, and we at the time, you had surveillance. Here, you had surveillance. It was hard to know whether it was the RCMP double checking security to Quebec or the Boers themselves.

At the time, I was just getting married, and I remember my former wife, Sophia land, saying that this guy came in the house to fix the bell phone and had a strange accent, but I think this was after our tour in South Africa. But at the time, already we had surveillance, and we didn’t know exactly who was who, but clearly they were among us, and they were also very well organized and scared, probably by the scope of what was just starting to happen. So then, if my recollection is correct, we start having other level of how we can establish a broader network.

Because one of the puzzling thing was, how come we have an anti-apartheid movement in Britain, in France, in the States, and we don’t have any in Canada? Didn’t make sense for us, and our effort was, yes, we need an anti-apartheid movement here, and then this geographical or linguistic gap cannot explain why we can’t have an apartheid movement. So we were the one advocating and asking for that, and even though we didn’t have the means to enforce, our idea was clear. So when they allow South African folks from the high rank leaders to come in Canada, and those were political leaders at the time, I think we already had an opening, but not yet the full opening. We had this Vancouver anti-apartheid meeting where we went and we presented, and it was not on the agenda, and we forced it with a couple of other people to ask for anti-apartheid network in Canada. So. We drafted a proposition to have that because it was conveyed by the youth clearly, but we could not understand why they were so reluctant to have it.

Gwen Schulman 30:15

Who’s reluctant?

Aziz Fall 30:19

The two organizations who were totally reluctant, and were instrumental in that meeting were TCLSAC and CIDMAA, and it took us a long time to understand why, as they were so embarrassed to have Thabo Mbeki and Toivo ya Toivo, who were there, and I remember they were supportive of our idea. So they were very embarrassed. Toivo was number two of SWAPO and Thabo Mbeki was one of the key player of the NEC negotiator and so on. So at that meeting, you had Sherpas of the so-called Progressive Conservative Walter McLean.

And I was so fortunate on my way back to Montreal to sitting next to Walter McLean, and Walter McLean was one of those MP with Joe Clark, who is drafting, actually the policy that is going to be the one under us by the so-called Progressive Conservative. And he was very interesting gentleman who, by chance, had two friends that I knew. One was Professor Colin Leys and John Saul. John Saul was absolutely adamant and absolutely against the ANC and SWAPO, but could not express it fully, but was absolutely against. And from the academic milieu, he was one of the fierce fighter against the idea of an anti-apartheid movement. You had other people who had, you know, mixed feelings about this issue, instrumental people like Linda Freeman, some I have forgotten their name, but it will probably come anyway. They all voted against.

Gwen Schulman 32:32

Why? What was their stated reason?

Aziz Fall 32:35

Their stated was at this stage, you know, the people in Winnipeg and Edmonton can manage it on their own. For the time being, in BC, they’re doing quite well. They can coordinate stuff, but the idea of having one single anti-apartheid in Canada was impossible, and until today, I find this thing is so intriguing. So we came back absolutely outraged.

And well, to make things easier, Quebec, solitude and Quebec, you know, idea of independence. Remember, we had this referendum and all of this, and then it became an issue of whether it’s Canada against Quebec. That is the region in which way we cannot have this anti-apartheid movement, at least in Quebec, as we did not have any. And you know, the fact that CIDMAA had a monopoly on it would not, you know, be a good reason to replace an anti-apartheid movement in Quebec.

But strangely, they also had the same behaviour, like they were totally against having an anti-apartheid network in Quebec as well. So the idea was, okay, why is that? The idea that is functioning elsewhere, and that was a clear demand of the anti-apartheid international movement, cannot function in this bloody country, not on the Canadian side, and not even in Quebec. So it was really something that was so intriguing, and it started to be a bitter issue. So we put that on the table of CIDMAA. And I resigned on the board of CIDMAA at that very moment where it was clear Dan, both Dan O’Meara and I were supportive of the idea, and the rest of the board was totally reluctant.

So we slammed the door and we left, and it created a huge crisis. And in a personal note, Pierre Beaudet was a friend. We spent almost 20 years without talking to each other, and we talked to each other in Tunis when I had to organize with Samir Amin a meeting in the World Social Forum, and they begged us to have access to the room, and that’s how I spend time talking with Pierre Beaudet after years of bitterness anyway, but that that’s what happens.

Doug Miller 35:33

Just to I don’t interrupt your flow too, too much, but at the same time you, you did get a trip to Southern Africa out of CIDMAA.

Aziz Fall 35:42

Yeah, and but it was not just CIDMAA. It was the CSN. It was churches. It was the beginning of an informal network, like they got the money and means to have the third fact-finding tour, because the only thing allowed was fact-finding tour to convince the society of what was happening. As at the time, you had mixed representation of what was happening. You know, op-ed in newspapers contesting the issue of what was happening on the ground people against communists and socialists. You know, very influential in the media, the Globe and Mail and so on and so on.

So the fact-finding tour was important. So you had hand-picked team that were sent and that would come and report. And that’s how, this is how our team was actually sent to South Africa, to the frontline state. Actually, we could not even go in South Africa. We are not granted any permission to do so. And if you recall, when we gather all this information on our tour in Lusaka, where we met with ANC and SWAPO folks, and then in Mozambique and in Zimbabwe, most of our material we had almost to send to through UNDP and whatever the other international organization that was in in Mozambique, so we can access it once we get back here. Anyway.

So at the time, I didn’t I had my Senegalese passport, and I think I was the only one who could not squeeze into South Africa. They double checked my passport twice at the time, I remember, you know, this guy was so paranoia, even my asthmatic, they wanted to take the photo stuff. And I said, but it’s just a photo. And I said, take a photo. And so I aim at taking a photo of the policeman. So he moved the hand, so I ended up taking the pictures of the flags. So that was the only time I’ve been in South Africa, was at the airport.

Aziz Fall 38:06

It’s so funny, because –

Gwen Schulman

Just to be clear, it was because we were transiting through South Africa. We weren’t officially entering South Africa, our plane was transiting through South Africa.

Aziz Fall

We were just in international zone.

Gwen Schulman

It was an unexpected thing, too. I don’t think originally we were supposed to, our flight was redirecting.

Aziz Fall

It was in the itinerary.

Gwen Schulman

Okay, yeah, we weren’t entering South Africa, we were transiting.

Aziz Fall 38:31

Exactly, we’re into the International zone from going from Komatipoort Mozambique to Joburg and flying back anyway.

But initially, when the tour was, thing was, it was planned that we would go also to South Africa. It was dismissed. So we ended up having an itinerary on the frontline state, and we had, at the time the beginning of the UDF was starting to be a movement, and we had a possibility of going to South Africa, but that was dismissed. That’s how we end up reducing the scope of our tour. And you know, it was an amazing thing, that was probably a great deal of learning for most of us, and contact and so on.

But here on the ground and I wonder if it’s the year after. I think that was the end of Reagan-Thatcher kind of opposition. I think that’s where George Bush arrived in power, and he enact and full enforcement, comprehensive anti-apartheid strategy in in the in the United States. So from there, the those who were reluctant to follow the courageous gesture of Brian Mulroney on the Commonwealth, where. Well, they just loosen their grip so.

And as I said, that period between 85, 84 to 89, 90 I mean, we don’t have a life in that period. That period is so intense, you know, the killings underground, the negotiation underground, who is, who, who you can trust, the sanction, this amazing ambience of we will win, but it’s just a question of time, what type of South Africa will have we want, we don’t want to have a second Lancaster House agreement in there. So, you know, we had to enforce the RDP from the very beginning, and so on and so on. And things were quite blurry. We didn’t know what was happening underground. De Klerk –

Doug Miller 40:58

Just to clarify for listeners, Lancaster House was the negotiations in England that led to Zimbabwe. Negotiations occurred at the end of 79 and 80.

Aziz Fall 41:11

And you know that period where you have a political independence but no economic independence. That was the you know, the trap of Zimbabwe. You know, willing buyer, willing seller, etc. So that picture of things happening underground within the Boer states, the African state, with Frederick de Klerk, who, you know, replaced Piet Botha, who started negotiating, you know, people like Tokyo Sexwale, Cyril Ramaphosa, Thabo Mbeki, all these guys, you know, playing key, key moments that at the time we could not really debunk what was happening anyway. The icon was released, I think, beginning of 90s. I forgot exactly when, and February –

Doug Miller 42:09

February 1990.

Aziz Fall 42:12

Yes, so along with other prisoners, and then, you know, the system started to crumble, and the apartheid laws were repealed, one after the other, but in the same token, you had fierce fighting among South African with Buthelezi and obviously, between radical ANC members and other at the time, we didn’t have the distance. But now I can really relate, you know, with the killing of Chris Hani, who was supposed to be the one in charge from the very beginning of the revolution, and the revolution was postponed, but at the time, most of our attention was to focus on the election to make sure that we will win the election.

Gwen Schulman 43:17

So what strategy was used? You played an instrumental role in the lead up to the election. So can you tell us about the strategies that that were deployed in Quebec?

Aziz Fall 43:32

Yes, so it’s good. You’re right. It’s good to go back on the effort, because, as I said on that very concentrated and highly volatile, we start first pressuring to have an anti-apartheid network in Quebec prior to the election issue. As I said, the rest were reluctant, so we started an advocacy strategy, first towards any NGO in AQOCI. AQOCI Being and being the association of most of the Quebec NGOs on international cooperation, their moral stand was obviously against apartheid. So they could not oppose the idea that they should be in the anti-apartheid movement. So we managed to go to the General Assembly and have a motion to support the idea of Quebec anti-apartheid network. We make sure that the Jesuit, the Chevaliers de Colomb, les Cercles de fermières, you know, we start touring even the Hells Angels we have tour most of this bloody country. That’s actually how I end up knowing this country.

And we won, and we start having an anti-apartheid network in Quebec with a divide of task, and CIDMAA, Raleigh, you know, finally accepted to join, reluctantly, but he finally accepted to join. I think that was an amazing momentum, as we had many, many things achieved. One was that we succeed in influencing the three level of government, and I say this very humbly, but we really succeed in doing that. First was here at the city hall with Madame Cousineau and Jean Doré, that we convinced.

And one tragic event happened to help us, and it was the killing of Anthony Griffin, a young man who’s told, you know, pack of cigarette and that was killed by Allan Gosset and to please, you know the people who are rioting already, and this is like a like our, our George Floyd, you know at the time, so you had the black community who are already, as I said, either supporting of PAC and some less of the ANC and I’m talking mainly of the Anglophone. Those were Jamaican folks, you know, from NDG and so on. We had relationship, but not that deep relationship.

So we were asking at the time to have Kent Park, where you had mixed community, including African, mainly students in Côte-des-Neiges and so on. So they refused to allow access to Kent Park, and they gave us the park near Barclay and Plamondon, and they named it after Winnie and Nelson Mandela in one way, to please the community as black issue, but also to obey to the motion that was finally adopted at the city hall to have Montreal as anti-apartheid city itself, and from there, In fact, it meant that the South African consulate were no longer, you know, welcome, and the things that were already planned in terms of divestment in the universities and the financial sector starting to be more and more supported by the society, so they had to just comply with what was happening.

But the city itself was, you know, renting offices to Trizec, which was the one hosting the South African consulate. So you had many, you know, contradiction like that in the society.

The second level was the Quebec government, who was slow, following the steps of the Progressive Conservative in Ottawa, who clearly were having, you know, clear gesture of goodwill in terms of dismantling the system. But at the time, we didn’t know that they were already part of discussion, secret discussion, of NATO countries with South Africa. And the issue was basically to drop their nuclear facility, drop their armament facility, allow many, many South Africans to seek asylum here in Canada, not to touch to investment and so on. So these guys were having deals that we could not at the time, we could not realize the scope of what it meant, and mainly which was almost a sense of betrayal.

And I do remember the critique of Pierre Beaudet at the time on the fact that part of the ANC leadership was corrupt, and that just was the cradle of John Saul and so on. And that not just the killing of Chris Hani, but also the fact that this so-called Black empowerment program was just a way of, you know, lifting those folks to the stages of a black bourgeoisie. And that they would drop the RDP to adopt the GEAR, which was once we had the victory.

And this landslide victory, they would abandon the, you know, the Socialist part to just follow blindly what was at the time in the whole African continent, which was basically a structural adjustment policy that was not enforced by the World Bank and IMF, but enforced by the new government itself, or, for the sake of, you know, avoiding that the investors will, you know, escape from the country. So we prepared, you know, frantically the election. And one of the funniest thing that happened while Mandela was touring this bloody country, it was at the city hall, and probably when, I recall, and this lady called Suzanne Dansereau with Pierre Beaudet come and whisper in my ear, well, “okay, you’re going to have five minutes with Nelson Mandela, and you just sit in this room and was at the city hall, and you not more, but just five minutes, okay?”. And I say, Yeah, and I sat.

Our cameras were there, selling, you know, T-shirt, you know, banners, buttons, whatever we were using as material. And we had, you know, a campaign for the past months, based on $1 one vote, those nice little boxes with the ANC flag on it. Prior to that, we had, I think, what was it? Two tickets to South Africa, you know, with a draw and so on. We were frantically organized with many, many other groups doing almost the same. It was an amazing period. Anyway. So there I was listening to any little sound from the corridors and so on, and not just Nelson Mandela never walked into that place, and I missed the whole event.

Doug Miller 51:43

Is that the same day he spoke in the field behind city hall?

Aziz Fall 51:48

Yes, Gwen. Gwen was there.

Doug Miller

Yeah, I was too.

Gwen Schulman

The only person who wasn’t there was Aziz.

Aziz Fall

When Schumann my most, I mean, I can’t praise enough all these people who have spent their life for our struggle. You know, whether Gwen or Marie-Hélène Bonin, all these guys for us through international they have spent their life to risk etc. And there she was, there selling material. We went together that very day, and I was squeezed inside, and I was hoping to have and to shake the hand of this man. I didn’t even sow the speed. I mean, I was there waiting and

Gwen Schulman 52:30

But we did go and sit in parliament with him a few years later Aziz –

Doug Miller 52:34

Yeah, I think before then, your starting role at plastie art?

Aziz Fall 52:41

I mean to shake hand of the guy, you know, I was supposed to have this very and that was, and, you know, I never really knew whether Suzanne did that on purpose or, you know, was just a protocol stuff. And I can’t wait to see her one day and ask her, you know, but anyway, I put it on the bitterness we had with those folks from CIDMAA at the time, and I forgive them anyway.

But I will never forgive the South African authorities and the new authorities, as you know, we had, and I’m carrying back and forth with those folks. But the biggest bitterness for me was NEPAD and Kananaskis and all this, yes, saying, you know, but this is clearly later, but from that period to the period that we are actually discussing, truly, at the time, Dan O’Meara formed a group called Consortium for South Africa, whatever it was like a consultant group, and some other folks start scattering.

And the amazing thing was that that new power start to mingle and to meet with people who were against. That was, you know, white liberals who were against the sanction, who were against the ANC, who are against any socialist thing, and they start to make business, you know, and distance themselves from, from our constituency, our groups, to the exception of Victor Moshe, who was the, then the ANC rep, But even himself when he was appointed at the SABC, started to distance himself.

So the question was, well, you are distancing yourself from the revolutionaries? Because obviously you are no longer, you know, in the business of a revolution. So I clearly understand, but not to the point that you would cut links, you know, and this is what happened, people who are not part of the anti-apartheid movement start pretending that they were part of it, opportunistic folks, you know, who were never part of the struggle being on the front line, on the front pages, and we were left behind. And the one who was supposed to, you know, tell the truth, and this is where I need to thank Ellie Bitzer, who happened to be our enemy. Say, explain who Ellie bit sir, the South African consulate, because we were, you know, weekly, demonstrating in front of his office. You know, this was a charming gentleman who, at the fall of apartheid, invite me to his house. And you know, guys from Pretoria. You know, white family, two kids. He was drawing once in a while. I need to turn off my phone here so and Ellie knew everything about us. He knew all of us. Never met a single of us. They had report on everything.

Gwen Schulman 56:06

And so they had been spying on us, that they knew.

Aziz Fall 56:10

Everything, they knew everything on me. So I said, “Okay, I know nothing about you, so you will tell me”. They almost became a friend that night. I didn’t drink wine, the famous South African wine that, you know, we had kind of digression, just to give you a sense, Vues d’Afrique , for example, was an organization that didn’t want to support the entire anti-apartheid struggle, because they were receiving wine from South Africa for their cocktail and so on.

Gwen Schulman 56:40

They were definitely receiving from the African Film Festival.

Aziz Fall 56:41

Yes, they were receiving, you know, from South African airlines, free tickets so they could convey, you know, the artists and so on. So anyway, those were the work of Ellie bits and all of these guys. And he admits that he was, himself reluctant to obey to orders from Pretoria, but he had to do so because that was his role, and he knew everything about us. And he is –

Gwen Schulman 57:10

Can you give more concrete example?

Aziz Fall 57:11

He’s the only one who wrote an op-ed in the South African diary from the consulate where he recognized the role of GRILA, the role of the anti-apartheid movement during this trial, that was obviously the new, the new South Africa, you know, the rainbow flag, but at least we had an acknowledgement for an authority. The second being this note that I got from this guy, I don’t know who is a brand new South African, and he says, thank you for your love and for love done for our freedom. Who wrote that this is more Sheikh –

Doug Miller 58:00

The South African Commissioner now, yeah.

Aziz Fall 58:04

But anyway, I’m, I’m not saying that we have done that to receive medals or recognition. We have done our duty, and we have doing you know, without being paid, as many have been paid to do things, we never received a dime, we use our own money and our sweat, and we’re very proud of that. GRILA never received a single subsidy, never until today.

And we’re very proud of what we have achieved. And as I was telling the other members the other day, we need to scan those archives, because your material on fax are fading and disappearing. Most of our material was through faxes and then some diskette that we still kept as archive. But those things should be saved, as I was saying, the South African themselves, I think they were just overwhelmed, and what happened is like a coup d’état within the state, and she has chosen populist after Thabo Mbeki. Zuma was a populist system, in a way, the party has lost its soul, and the socialist path was abandoned. And I think part of the plot that killed Chris Hani is one of the explanation, and as we were close to that tendency.

And I would say that one of the funny things is when Winnie Mandela was dragged into that famous Stompie story, you know, where this young football team was accused of, you know, part of the retaliation and killing and torture and so on. Anyway, here the first reaction was to get rid of her name on the park so it was no longer Nelson and Winnie Mandela. The park was just named Nelson Mandela, and there I have planted a tree. And a few years later, I noticed that the tree was, you know, cut with knives, but the tree survived, but had some scar. And for me, it’s a good image of what actually happened. The system is still around, still solid, but with big scar, including ours. And you know what? I think, as I am going to present two conference in Ottawa next Monday, I would try to see the South African High Commission, as I’m going to visit just to see because obviously he’s a friend, and he’s aware of what we have done, but we never met. I have visited probably half of African countries mostly invited, and roughly probably 60 countries in the world, and I have not been invited in South Africa yet.

Doug Miller

Wow.

Aziz Fall

So the question here is, who are the new friends, and why is it important that shows like yours, you know, are part of the written history, because the story as it is told and as it is shown, obviously, is twisted, and the contribution of Canada, which is, you know, trumpeted everywhere is possible and was possible because of the work of small, little soldiers, foot soldiers like us, we are the one who made this thing possible, not Mulroney. It was an endless work to convince this bloody country.

And you know what, while the system was falling, the native people start to uprise in here it was the anti-apartheid folks, Chengiah and myself and many other guys who were taking blankets and food to Kanesatake and Kahnawake because that was the starting point of our struggle. While apartheid had fallen, the system is still around. So this country had obey to the realistic position that was to be taken at the time, they were no longer able to be supportive of that system, so they had to release the stream to find ways. You know, at one point, we had 1000s of Boers who seek asylum. They even have their phone diary. If you need a plumber, they could call among themselves from Calgary to BC, they are by the 1000s in this bloody country.

So it’s, I won’t say we have bitterness, but we know that if we’ve had taken another path, if we had fulfilled the RDP demand, South Africa would be the locomotive, would be the one you know in charge of African development today,

Doug Miller

Even the Reconstruction and Development Programme?

Aziz Fall 1:03:32

Yeah, even, even say that again, sorry.

Doug Miller 1:03:35

The RDP being the ANC, original Reconstruction and Development Programme based on the charter.

Aziz Fall 1:03:41

Yes, that was, that was our goal, and still our goal, and the fact that it was abandoned, the fact that the movement split, the fact that you have like, you know, populist like Malema and all these guys, you know, and the fact that you still have slums. You have, you know, problem of housing. You still have health issues. You have amazing, amazing inequalities. There’s people are still living in South Africa like in good old days. You know, you no longer need the law to be enforced.

But economically, nothing has changed. And for us, the apartheid system is at the world scale level. What we’ve been fighting there. It’s on the world scale level. It’s an apartheid system. This world system is an apartheid system. It is built on the very, very same type of pattern and matrix, and that’s why we are internationalist, and we are keep on doing the same bloody thing, which is, you know, repeating this. It’s almost a mantra, and it’s sad, because we no longer have the energy of our youth. Is, you know, but we are trying to make sure that they, they understand what happened. And, you know, as long I have energy, I will, I will keep on, you know, knocking on the same doors and doing the same bloody work we’ve done.

But the South African have to learn, you know, the past that allows them today to be free and to know who are their friends, who are their true friends. And we are not saying –

Doug Miller 1:05:34

Because we are, summary. There it is. You’ve just sort of wrapped it up very nicely and tied a bow on it there.

Aziz Fall 1:05:42

Yeah, I mean, I mean, these are the fact and it’s not a question of bitterness. It’s a question of loyalty, you know, it’s a question of, you know, what type of horizon, what type of development we want, what, why? Why would we do such things? To build something together, that was our hope. And look, look the state of Mozambique today. Look what happened in Angola. Look, it says.

Doug Miller 1:06:07

It’s incredible.

Aziz Fall 1:06:10

So anyway, we still hope, and this is part of the struggle we have to continue. And I think this is amazing, that you can help, in a way, convey what really happened. And it’s like a puzzle. You know, once we have the full picture, even you have missing dots, you would have a clear picture of what happened. It’s an important history. Yeah, it is history. So, you know, we are very fortunate to have been part of this. And we were doing this while we were also doing other stuff. We as soon as we stopped this thing, we started with this impunity case, you know, on the Sankara case. And so we’ve been doing many, many things, the foreign military base issue, that issue, all of six are absolutely related,

Gwen Schulman 1:07:06

The Niger Delta, Delta, you know.

Aziz Fall 1:07:09

And today we are here trying to build a fifth International, trying to make many, many efforts, but it’s still the same aim, and I hope. And you know, I’m kind of resisting to go, because I can go on my own. And one of the strange thing is, why am I even resisting to go? You know? Because I find, I still find intriguing that our comrades, that we still have in the place, and it’s true, they are all they have been, even themselves have been sidelined, you know, so they are the one who have some bitterness, not us. Most of our true comrades today have been sidelined in South Africa. It’s not just us, it’s this is the consequences, because the left has been sidelined that we are in this situation, not the contrary Iran. It’s not the other way around. It’s not that they have forgotten their allies from outside. I was talking to my friend Makoto Katsumata from the Japanese anti-apartheid network. All these people are fed up, you know, discouraged. What happened the European folks, etc., some who have benefited from the system, late boomers, but not the true, genuine fighters? They’re not part of this endeavour anymore.

Doug Miller 1:08:33

Well, what can I say that? Thank you, Aziz. What an amazing overview.

Aziz Fall 1:08:45

Anyway, guys, it’s just be –

Gwen Schulman 1:08:47

It would be interesting to know if it’s a different story in French.

Aziz Fall 1:08:51

Because, but, I mean, you know the fact that I still, I think my brain is twisting between Wolof and French, so let’s explain how it’s hard to convey. I think that it should be at least understood. You know, my broken English would work.

Gwen Schulman 1:09:08

No, your English is perfect. So merciful. Merci. Say more [French]

Aziz Fall

Thank you. Thank you.

Aziz Fall 1:09:15

Anyway, only time plan prediction

Aziz Fall 1:09:17

We may anyway. I said why it is so did that?

Aziz Fall 1:09:30

Kick shows the fundamental key for new, yeah, yeah, stamp area, three special major so linear

Gwen Schulman 1:09:57

city of. In attribute as he defer support, new,

Doug Miller 1:10:11

well, okay, well, what I’m going to do?